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There are fewer case studies of entrepreneurial failure than of 
entrepreneurial success. The records of failed businesses usually do 
not survive. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is an example of a failed 
company where the records survived. In 1932 a new company was 
organized that acquired the failed company’s name and assets. One 
of the assets was the brand name “Dole”. Today “Dole” is one of the 
leading brand names in fresh and processed fruit and vegetables. The 
origin of the brand name is the eponymous James Drummond Dole, 
who founded the Hawaiian Pineapple Company in 1901, which is one 
of the predecessors of today’s Dole Food Company, Inc. It is ironic 
that his name has survived as an international brand name because 
Dole lost control of his company in 1932, in what was the American 
Territory of Hawai‘i’s largest inter-war business failure. This article 
explores and analyzes the reasons for the failure of the Hawaiian Pine-
apple Co.
Dole migrated from his native Massachusetts to the Hawaiian 
Islands in late 1899 to take up the cultivation of coffee at a home-
stead settlement. However, at the time coffee turned out not to be a 
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viable crop in Hawai‘i so he switched to pineapples. Exporting fresh 
pineapples to the continental United States resulted in a high level of 
wastage in the era before modern refrigerated sea and air transporta-
tion. So Dole decided to process the fruit before it was exported. At 
the time fruit was often preserved in glass containers and one of his 
fellow pineapple growers at the settlement adopted this method of 
preserving his fruit. However, Dole chose to preserve his fruit in tin 
cans.1 This proved to be a wise choice. 
After incorporating his company Dole sought out investors. At this 
time Hawai‘i’s economy, society, and government was dominated by 
a business oligarchy that derived its fortune from the cultivation of 
sugar cane.2 The oligarchy was very skeptical about the prospects of 
pineapple cultivation and canning. Two previous attempts to develop 
a pineapple canning industry in Hawai‘i had been unsuccessful. So 
Dole had to raise the capital for his company from outside Hawai‘i. 
Early investors included Sussman & Wormser of San Francisco and 
Joseph H. Hunt and August C. Baumgartner of Hunt Brothers Pack-
ing Co. of Santa Rosa, California.3 Dole has sometimes been portrayed 
as an outsider. However, he was from the very beginning part of 
Hawai‘i’s business oligarchy. Sanford Ballard Dole, his second cousin, 
was the ﬁ rst governor of the United States Territory of Hawai‘i, which 
had been established in 1900. Although his cousin did not invest in 
his business,4 Walter F. Dillingham, the son of one of Hawai‘i’s lead-
ing businessmen, actively supported Dole’s enterprise from the very 
beginning.5 
During the ﬁ rst years of the industry the demand for canned pine-
apple in the continental United States grew quickly and several other 
entrepreneurs entered the industry. However, the Panic of 1907 in 
the continental United States resulted in a reduction in demand for 
Hawaiian canned pineapple. Dole was the prime mover in the indus-
try’s successful response to this crisis. An industry association was cre-
ated to organize a cooperative advertising campaign in the continen-
tal United States to revive demand.6 At this time Dole and the other 
canners had not developed their own brands. Most of their output 
was sold with wholesalers’ brand labels such as “Sussman & Wormser.” 
Demand for Hawaiian canned pineapple revived perhaps as a result 
of the advertising campaign. 
Production rose steadily from 243,000 cases in 1909 to 1,775,000 
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cases in 1920.7 During this period Dole invested heavily in cannery 
technology. The invention of the Ginaca machine was one of a series 
of notable breakthroughs at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.8 Although 
production had risen steadily in every year since 1909, Dole now faced 
a serious production constraint that could not be overcome by invest-
ment in technology or advertising. The industry was facing increasing 
difﬁ culty purchasing or leasing additional land for pineapple cultiva-
tion. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. pro-
duced 90 percent of its fruit on 10,000 acres of land owned or under 
lease to the company. The remaining ten percent came from inde-
pendent growers under a sliding scale contract, based on the price 
of the canned product. In 1920 for the ﬁ rst time in the history of the 
Hawaiian Pineapple Co., another company, the California Packing 
Corporation, had achieved a higher output of canned pineapple. The 
company was in second place the following year. 
Dole began a quest to acquire additional land in order to both meet 
the growing demand for canned pineapple in the continental United 
States and to regain ﬁ rst place for his company. In 1922, the company 
made an agreement with the Waialua Agricultural Co., a sugar planta-
tion afﬁ liated with Castle & Cooke, one of Hawai‘i’s “Big Five” sugar 
factors, obtaining more permanent tenure of 4,000 acres of land that 
the company had leased before the war, and another 8,000 additional 
acres. In return for a 17 year prepaid lease and $1,250,000 in cash, 
Dole relinquished a one-third interest in the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. 
to the Waialua Agricultural Co. This gave Castle & Cooke representa-
tion on the pineapple company’s board and a say in its direction. This 
was a major strategic error. Like the other “Big Five” sugar factors in 
Hawai‘i, Castle & Cooke used a web of interlocking directorships to 
ensure that the companies afﬁ liated with it made purchasing decisions 
that favored each other. The “Big Five” had similarities with the Japa-
nese zaibatsu [ﬁ nancial combine]. Dole was not prepared to accept the 
rules of the system he became part of in 1922. Castle & Cooke toler-
ated Dole’s deﬁ ance during the 1920s when the Hawaiian Pineapple 
Co. was going from strength to strength under his leadership.
While this transaction was sufﬁ cient to regain ﬁ rst place in 1922 
from the California Packing Corporation, the additional land would 
not meet the expected increase in demand during the remainder of 
the decade. So Dole was much more ambitious. The company also 
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exercised an option using the cash from the Waialua transaction to 
purchase the island of Länai from Henry A. and Frank F. Baldwin for 
$1,100,000. Länai contained at least 20,000 acres of potential pine-
apple land out of a total of 89,000 acres. The deal was completed in 
December 1922, and the company began a huge development proj-
ect, the transformation of a sparsely inhabited island into a pineapple 
plantation. A previous attempt around 1906 to develop a sugar plan-
tation at Keamoku, opposite Lahaina, had failed. The company spent 
as much as $5,000,000 on the project between 1922 and the early 
1930s.9 
A windbreak ﬁ ve miles long was thrown up, and large gang ploughs 
and caterpillar tractors were set to work 24 hours a day, turning hun-
dreds of acres of soil and preparing it for planting. The company’s 
development project included the construction of two reservoirs at 
Ka‘ihoelana, with a capacity of 3,390,000 gallons of water. The water 
was lifted 750 feet by electric pumps from the tunnels in the bottom of 
the Maunalei Gulch and carried to the reservoirs in six inch redwood 
pipe over a distance of 5,300 feet. Water was distributed through an 
elaborate pipe system to the pineapple ﬁ elds. The company spent 
$1,500,000 on the construction of an artiﬁ cial harbor which was 
named Kaumalapau Harbor. On the shoreline the company blasted 
cliffs and threw out a 30 feet long breakwater of 116,000 tons of rock 
obtained by breaking up and moving a rock face, 65 feet deep and 
300 feet at its base, creating a harbor with a depth of 27 feet and 
a channel entrance of 65 feet. Ships tied up at a wharf constructed 
from 4,000 cubic yards of concrete. At the back of the wharf, a large 
open square was built surrounded by the harbor buildings. From the 
harbor, through the pineapple ﬁ elds, the company laid a seven mile 
20 foot wide macadamized road rising 1,600 feet to the plantation 
village of Länai City.
Länai City was built to house Dole’s plantation employees. Within 
its boundaries were schools, churches, model playgrounds, baseball 
ﬁ elds, a swimming pool, tennis courts, an auditorium, a cinema, and 
radio telephones. Länai City was conceived of as a model village, and 
did indeed contrast favorably with the deplorable conditions in many 
of the sugar plantation villages.10 Dole was a paternalistic Christian 
employer in the mold of the great nineteenth British Nonconform-
ist businessmen. While he was opposed to labor unions, he was an 
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enthusiastic welfare capitalist. This was undoubtedly the result of his 
father’s inﬂ uence. Charles F. Dole, was a member of an abolitionist 
family and a Unitarian church minister.11 James D. Dole regarded as 
his greatest achievement 
. . . the esprit de corps and teamwork of the Hawaiian Pineapple Com-
pany organization that was built up during my leadership. With few 
exceptions this existed from bottom to top; so far as possible every man 
an individual, treated as such and paid as such as many different rates 
of pay as could be justiﬁ ed; my ofﬁ ce door open to any employee; a 
non-contributing pension system inaugurated in 1920; a proﬁ t-shar-
ing system that rewarded those and only those who could affect the 
proﬁ ts and who could realize in advance and throughout the year the 
importance to themselves of the company’s success. For others, differ-
ent incentives . . .12 
In practice, as has been the case with many similar model housing 
projects, Dole’s employees found the village to be far from ideal. Plan-
tation rules regulated almost every aspect of their lives. Dole’s man-
ager, Bloomﬁ eld-Brown, even decided what plants employees might 
grow in their backyards; the cultivation of vegetables was expressly 
forbidden. Bloomﬁ eld-Brown is alleged to have ruled Länai “like a 
dictator.” Länai City was also effectively racially segregated. Dole’s 
Asian and Native Hawaiian employees lived in small homes with no 
running water, no electricity or gas, and no inside bathrooms. Dole’s 
white employees were separated from the rest of the workforce, and 
lived in palatial detached houses on what the other employees called 
“Snob Hill,” a parody on San Francisco’s pretentious “Nob Hill”.13 
Dole’s Länai project was a great operational success. By 1929 the 
Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was processing 50,000 tons of fresh fruit from 
Länai, the equivalent of 1.5 million cases of canned fruit, more than 
one third of the company’s total pack.14 During the 1920s, the Hawai-
ian Pineapple Co. was the only one of the three major canners that 
produced for the private brand market. The California Packing Cor-
poration and Libby, McNeill & Libby sold their product using their 
own brands, “Del Monte” and “Libby’s” respectively. With such a large 
proportion of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company’s annual pack being 
sold to private brand buyers, no promotional effort was put on the 
brand names owned by the company. The company had marketed its 
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products under a number of different brand names, including “Dia-
mond Head,” “Outrigger,” “Hawaiian Club,” and “Paradise Island.” 
However, by the 1920s production and consumer acceptance of the 
company’s products had reached a point where it became commer-
cially unsound to continue on this basis. The company decided that 
it was time to develop a single standard brand for its product. In a 
carefully devised plan, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. began a national 
advertising campaign in April 1927. This was the ﬁ rst time the com-
pany had advertised its product independently of the Association of 
Hawaiian Pineapple Canners. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were 
earmarked for a campaign over several years. 
The advertisements were centered on the brand name “Dole,” 
which was stamped in bas-relief on the top of every can of pineapple 
produced by the company. This was a practice which had previously 
been adopted by California Packing Corporation during the World 
War I boom. It was another kind of cooperative marketing venture, 
in as much as it added to the selling force of “own brand” labels. In 
this period, pineapple was packed in three grades: fancy, choice and 
standard. The can tops were stamped “Dole 1,” “Dole 2,” and “Dole 3” 
to identify those grades. The advertising was designed to enable con-
sumers to identify the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s products from other 
company’s products, no matter what label the can carried.15 
The advertising campaign was launched in a spectacular way. On 
May 25, 1927 James D. Dole offered $25,000 to the ﬁ rst ﬂ yer to cross 
from the North American continent to Honolulu, Hawai‘i, in a non-
stop ﬂ ight. Dole, a member of the National Aeronautic Association, 
set up the competition four days after Charles Lindbergh successfully 
completed his solo ﬂ ight across the Atlantic from New York to Paris.16 
The competition was held on August 16, 1927. Four airplanes left 
Oakland Airport, California, bound for Honolulu. On August 17 the 
two prizes of $25,000 and $10,000 were won respectively by Arthur 
C. Goebel’s “Woolaroc” and Martin Jensen’s “Aloha.” Unfortunately, 
these men’s triumph over the “tyranny of distance” was marred by the 
fact that the other two competitors who left Oakland failed to arrive. 
Despite an extensive search by the United States Navy and one hun-
dred sampans belonging to the Japanese American ﬁ shing associations 
of Hawai‘i, nothing was ever seen of these two planes again. Indeed, 
to exacerbate the tragedy, an unsuccessful competitor in the “Dole 
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Race,” who ﬂ ew along the route taken by the competitors looking for 
the missing planes also disappeared and was never seen again.
The Dole Race highlights the difﬁ cult relationship between Dole 
and Hawai‘i’s business leaders. Martin Jensen, whose plane won the 
second prize for Hawai‘i, had to mortgage everything he owned, bor-
row money on notes, and rely on charity to secure funds to enter the 
race. Although Hawai‘i’s business oligarchy expected to get hundreds 
of thousands of dollars of free advertising out of the Dole Race, as 
Dole put up the prize money, they showed no generosity to the Terri-
tory’s own entry in the race. Neither the Honolulu Chamber of Com-
merce nor the Hawai‘i Tourist Bureau contributed any money. Jen-
sen’s pilot, Paul Schluter, did not even have enough money to pay for 
his return trip to California. No steamship company was prepared to 
pay his fare, although the business oligarchy’s steamship companies 
and hotels in Hawaii expected to beneﬁ t from the free advertising. 
Schluter’s passage home was eventually paid for by Dole.17 
This conﬁ rmed Dole’s view that the business oligarchy was after 
“his scalp.” Earlier in the year he had been involved in a public dis-
pute with Lorrin A. Thurston, publisher of the Honolulu Advertiser, a 
leading member of the oligarchy. Dole had objected to the Advertis-
er’s support for a legislative appropriation to the Tourist Bureau on 
the grounds that it was no longer an infant industry. He alleged that 
“Unfortunately for me The Advertiser did not take the same interest 
in the pineapple business in the early stages that it now takes in the 
Tourist Business!” Thurston strongly refuted the charge. He recalled 
that in the early days of the industry he had been attorney and adviser 
to James B. Castle, then the controlling owner of the Wahiawa Consol-
idated Pineapple Co. (Castle had also acted as Honolulu agent for the 
pineapple canner, Captain Cook Coffee Co., in the early twentieth 
century. His brother, William Richards Castle, had purchased W.W. 
Brunner’s interest in the company around 1905.) Thurston was the 
representative of this company on the Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ 
Association committee, which under the leadership of Dole had ini-
tiated the ﬁ rst cooperative advertising campaign. Thurston was ada-
mant that he had backed the advertising campaign to the limit.18 
The Dole Race established a general sales momentum for canned 
pineapple. In 1928, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. packed more than 
3.2 million cases, sold them for just under $16 million, and earned 
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a net proﬁ t of $2.8 million. During 1928, Robert I. Bentley, presi-
dent of California Packing Corporation, visited Honolulu to discuss 
the possibility of a merger with the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. James D. 
Dole and his company’s board rejected Bentley’s terms as unsatisfac-
tory.19 Dole declared that the “Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is not making 
and has no intention of making any effort to sell out.” 20 In retrospect, 
given what was to occur four years later, Dole should have accepted 
California Packing Corporation’s cash offer. However, at that time 
Dole could not have foreseen the collapse of his company. He was 
still seeking to acquire even further production capacity—this time 
outside the United States in the British colony of Fiji. 
In the late 1920s, the Fijian government was actively promoting 
the development of a pineapple canning industry in the colony. In 
1928, the president of the Suva Chamber of Commerce visited Hono-
lulu and attempted to interest the Hawai‘i pineapple canners in the 
possibilities of developing the pineapple industry in Fiji. Sir J. May-
nard Hedstrom, a colonial businessman in Fiji, met with the board 
of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in April to discuss his ideas regarding 
the growing and canning of pineapples in Fiji. He suggested that Fiji 
would be ideal for exporting to the British Empire and in particular 
Canada. As a result Dole and the board decided to send one of its 
directors, Kenneth B. Barnes, and two of its technicians, a plant super-
intendent, W.A. Cleghorn, and its chief engineer, S.T. Hoyt, to Fiji 
in late 1928, to consider the possibility of extending its growing and 
canning activities to the colony.21 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. sub-
sequently took up an option from the colonial government of more 
than 60,000 acres for three years as an experimental stage on certain 
attractive concessional terms with regard to rent, commencing at the 
end of 1929.22 In April 1932 the company decided to discontinue the 
Fijian project as of June 30, and not take up its land option from the 
Fijian government. The experiment had not been a success.23 
After California Packing Corporation’s cash offer had been 
rejected, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s shares were listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange for the ﬁ rst time at the end of November 1928.24 
The company continued to face an expanding market for its products. 
In 1929 production was so short, that the company had prorate deliv-
eries 15 percent below sales. Stocks on hand fell to a bare minimum. 
It was during this year that the company began a prolonged national 
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advertising program featuring the can top concept.25 On November 1, 
1930 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. began an advertising campaign in 
continental United States newspapers. This was the ﬁ rst time that the 
company adopted newspapers as an advertising medium. The com-
pany also increased its advertising space in magazines in 1931.26 
The Great Depression of the 1930s had a delayed impact on 
Hawai‘i’s pineapple industry. Demand for canned pineapple in the 
continental United States did not begin to collapse until the second 
half of 1931. At the same time, Californian canners dumped their 
products on the market at below the cost of production. The result 
was a huge increase in inventories of canned pineapple and a collapse 
in the wholesale and retail price. In Hawai‘i, as in the continental 
United States, the large canners had more resources to restructure 
than the small canners. Small canners in both Hawai‘i and the conti-
nental United States went out of business. The large national canners, 
such as California Packing Corporation, increased their domination 
of the industry. Price cutting meant consumers could still purchase 
canned foods in essentially the same quantity as before. 
Unlike in the continental United States, the Depression in Hawai‘i 
proved to be relatively short-lived. Perhaps this was a reﬂ ection of the 
institutional structure of Hawai‘i. Noel Kent argues that Hawai‘i’s 
business oligarchy sought to protect the Territory’s existing socio-
economic structure during the 1930s. But he does not believe that 
this structure provided the Hawai‘i’s economy with the capacity to 
isolate itself from the Depression.27 In fact Hawai‘i’s business leaders 
did succeed in insulating the economy from the worst effects of the 
Depression.
The sugar planters sought to adjust to the Depression by adopting 
three measures. The ﬁ rst was the repatriation of unemployed Filipino 
laborers. Thus they exported a signiﬁ cant part of Hawaii’s unemploy-
ment to the Philippines. Unemployment peaked at estimated 6.9 per-
cent and a year later was only about 3.0 percent of the civilian labor 
force, compared to 21.7 percent in the continental United States. 
The second was a reduction in their costs of production. The princi-
pal means of achieving this was to substitute machinery for labor. The 
third was economic diversiﬁ cation. The sugar industry diversiﬁ ed into 
pineapple canning.28 
The immediate effects of the Depression for the pineapple indus-
158   the hawaiian journal of history
try were catastrophic. The cost of the Länai project meant that Dole’s 
company became ﬁ nancially over-exposed after the Great Depres-
sion began to adversely affect sales of their product in the continen-
tal United States. Between 1931 and 1932 the production of canned 
pineapple by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company fell by over 80 per-
cent from 4,862,000 cases to 847,000 cases as can be seen in Figure 
2.29 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was already under severe ﬁ nancial 
pressure at the beginning of 1931. Figure 1 shows that the company 
posted a net loss of $3.8 million in 1931. In April, James D. Dole 
was forced to raise a $5 million loan. The loan was underwritten by 
a syndicate of banks and ﬁ nance houses controlled by Hawai‘i’s busi-
ness oligarchy, Bank of Hawaii, Bishop First National Bank, Hawaiian 
Trust Co., and the Bishop Trust Co., distributed through a continen-
tal group headed by the American Securities Co. of San Francisco 
and Pierce, Fair & Co.30 This was to prove in retrospect a fatal error of 
judgment on the part of Dole, as will be shown below. 
Dole sought to avert the impending crisis by adopting a “conserva-
tive ﬁ nancial policy.” 31 One of the most important parts of this policy 
was the reduction of the excessive cost of shipping the company’s 
product to the United States. Prince Kuhio, the Hawaiian Delegate in 
Congress, had observed in 1911 that the water transportation monop-
oly in Hawai‘i helped explain why small industries did not seem to 
thrive in the Territory.32 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had paid very 
little attention to this large component of their costs until after the 
beginning of the Great Depression in the continental United States 
in late 1929. However, it seems to be the case that shipping costs had 
been high throughout most of the history of the company. 
During World War I, according to Dole, the Matson Navigation Co. 
maintained rates that under the circumstances were very low. So after 
the resumption of peace in November 1918, he was very reluctant to 
press them for a lower freight rate, or to force a considerable part of 
the movement of their goods back to their natural channel, which 
was by sea from Hawai‘i ports to the large metropolitan centers on or 
near the East Coast. However, the matter was occasionally discussed 
by the board of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., particularly as freight 
rates began to fall between the Paciﬁ c Coast and the Atlantic ports, 
thus leading to heavier shipments at low rates, of canned fruits and 
other competitive products from Paciﬁ c ports to the Atlantic. 
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During the 1920s the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. established the prac-
tice of shipping canned pineapples by the Matson Line to San Fran-
cisco, rehandling it in the port, and reshipping it from San Francisco 
to the East Coast by the inter-coastal shipping lines.33 In 1924, for 
example, 83 percent of direct water-borne trade in canned pineapple 
between Hawai‘i and overseas ports was with San Francisco. Another 
Sources: Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities, No. 20, Industrial 
Section, 1919, New York: Poor’s Publishing Co., 1919, p. 2888; Honolulu Stock 
Exchange, Manual of Hawaiian Securities: Statements of 1925, Honolulu: 1925, p. 
99; Moody’s Manual of Industrials: American and Foreign Securities 1930, New York: 
Moody’s Investors Service, 1931, p. 1334; Commercial and Financial Chronicle: Vol. 
136, No. 2, May 20, 1933, p. 3552; Vol. 137, No. 1, July 22, 1933, p. 699; Vol. 139, 
No. 1, August 4, 1934, p. 765. 
Source: 1941 Western Canner and Packer Yearbook, p. 132. 
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5.8 percent was with other West Coast ports. Only 10.3 percent was 
with Gulf and East Coast ports.34 This was an inefﬁ cient method result-
ing in increased damage to the goods caused by the extra handling. 
It entailed the payment of the full freight rate from Honolulu to San 
Francisco and the full rate from San Francisco to the East Coast ports. 
The freight rate for this reached a peak of $14.95 per ton, and was 
later reduced to $13.95 per ton. 
The reduced proﬁ t margins on its products that followed the ﬁ nan-
cial collapse in New York in the fall of 1929 resulted in a need for 
lower costs, which led the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to give increas-
ing attention to the desirability of taking advantage of the lower rates 
offered by shipping lines in the Paciﬁ c. It became apparent to Dole 
that the sugar planters were ahead of his company in this direction, 
shipping sugar from Hawai‘i by the Isthmian Steamship Co., a sub-
sidiary of the U.S. Steel Corp, to the East Coast at $7.5 per ton, later 
reduced to $7. 
In 1929, someone forcefully drew Dole’s attention to the fact that 
he was paying a price for cans based on a Honolulu price for tin plate, 
which was devised by adding to the f.o.b. [free on board] East Coast 
price the full combination freight rate by way of San Francisco. The 
same Isthmian Line ships were going through Honolulu with tin plate 
in their holds, which they were delivering in Japan at a freight rate 
from the East Coast of between $7 and $8 per ton. Dole accordingly, 
requested the American Can Co. to take up the matter with the U.S. 
Steel Corp. which immediately inaugurated a $9 freight rate from the 
East Coast to Honolulu.
The new $9 freight rate for tin plate and the increasing volume of 
sugar being shipped from Hawai‘i at a low rate by this route caused 
Dole to give further attention to the subject. He took it up “very vigor-
ously” with the Matson Navigation Co. over a period of many months, 
pointing out the necessity of direct shipment to the East Coast and 
lower rates between Honolulu and San Francisco. The Matson Line, 
after suggesting that they might be prepared to reduce the rate to 
$10, changed their minds, and decided not to take any action.
In February 1931, after weeks without any action, Dole took up 
the matter in person with E.D. Tenney, chairman of Castle & Cooke, 
and chairman of the Matson Navigation Co. (Castle & Cooke were 
the Honolulu agents for Matson). After outlining the problem, Dole 
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asked Tenney to advise him as to the best course of action. Tenney 
replied that it was clearly Dole’s duty to secure the desired freight rate 
for his stockholders if he could do it. He suggested that Dole ought to 
give Matson a chance at it. Shortly thereafter Dole received a commu-
nication from Matson, through Castle & Cooke, offering the Hawai-
ian Pineapple Co. an $11 rate to the East Coast, it being understood 
that Matson and the Isthmian Line would be working together. 
However, Dole thought that the $11 rate was altogether too high 
under the circumstances. He did not feel that his company would be 
justiﬁ ed in accepting it. He was fully convinced that shipping condi-
tions in the world were such that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. could 
secure a rate of $10 or lower, even if he did not use the Isthmian 
Line. Dole decided to put the matter before the ten directors of the 
Hawaiian Pineapple Co., ﬁ ve of whom were also directors of Castle & 
Cooke. After a full discussion of the subject, and with no arguments 
following the example of the sugar planters in shipping to East Coast 
ports by the Isthmian Line, a motion was unanimously carried that the 
proposition on behalf of the Matson Navigation Co. be rejected. Fur-
thermore, Dole, as president of the company, was given full authority 
to use his own judgment in negotiating a freight contract. However, 
Dole failed to note an important qualiﬁ cation “that the Matson Navi-
gation Company are to participate in the agreement if such participa-
tion can be arranged without too great a sacriﬁ ce.” 35 
In May 1931 Dole ﬁ nalized a three year contract with the Isthmian 
Line in New York. It provided for the direct shipment of canned pine-
apple from Hawai‘i ports to Gulf and Atlantic ports at a freight rate 
of $10 per ton, as compared with the former rate of $13.95. It repre-
sented a saving of $72,000 compared with the $11 quoted by Matson. 
Even taking into account Dole’s assumption that direct eastern ship-
ments would increase from 44 percent to 60 percent of the total, the 
saving was still only $96,000.36 Dole was aware of the wider implica-
tions of this agreement. As he said, 
. . . it seems economically unsound to ship Honolulu-New York freight 
to San Francisco, break bulk and reload. . . The San Francisco aim is 
that Hawaiian freight should move via San Francisco, and take a rate 
equivalent to the rate from Honolulu to San Francisco plus the rate 
from San Francisco to the East Coast . . . The heart of the matter is that 
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over a period of time the cheaper we can get out Hawaiian products to 
the people of the United States, the sounder is the economic structure 
of Hawaii. To this end we must constantly be at work.37 
The Isthmian agreement was welcomed by many of the opponents 
of the business oligarchy that controlled Hawaii. The editor of the 
Hawaii Hochi, Frederick Makino,38 regarded it as one of the most 
important recent developments affecting the interests of everyone in 
the Territory. 
The transportation tentacle of the Octopus which has held Hawaii in 
its grasp for so many years has been given a severe blow. It is writhing 
and twisting in a desperate attempt to renew its hold, but its suckers are 
loosening and slipping. Already a large share of the pineapple business 
has escaped from its clutches. Other shippers are threatening to follow 
the example of Jim Dole and break away from the monopoly . . .
Jimmy Dole certainly started something when he slipped this one 
over the people who had been squeezing him on freight rates . . . Now 
[William P.] Roth [president of Matson] is frantically trying to repair 
the damage and prevent a stampede of competition that would free 
Hawaii from the grasp of the Octopus! . . .39 
Unfortunately, for Dole, the businessmen who controlled the Mat-
son Navigation Co. did not appreciate his unwillingness to accept 
their control over the Hawai‘i’s economy.40 As the Hawaii Hochi had 
observed, in the 1920s Matson had secured a virtual monopoly of all 
freight and passenger shipping touching Hawai‘i. By the late 1930s, 
Matson controlled over 98 percent of the freight carried to and from 
Hawai‘i and the West Coast ports. This situation was the result of 
extensive advertising and the establishment of modern hotels and 
recreational facilities in Hawai‘i, and in particular its inter-corporate 
relationship with the sugar industry of Hawai‘i.41 They had no wish 
to see the re-introduction of open competition and deeply resented 
being forced to respond to this agreement by reducing to within ﬁ fty 
cents of the Isthmian rate, their rate for shipments from Hawai‘i to 
Atlantic and Gulf ports with San Francisco.42 
After having made a net operating loss of $3.8 million in 1931, 
the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. made losses of $5.5 million during the 
ﬁ rst nine months of 1932. Dole tried unsuccessfully to raise a new $5 
james d. dole   163
million loan in San Francisco in April. This provided the opportunity 
for the sugar factor, Castle & Cooke, a minority shareholder in his 
company, to force through a plan for the reorganization of Dole’s 
company. Dole was deposed. The assets of his failed company were 
transferred to a new company in which Castle & Cooke had a 56.25 
percent share, thus giving them majority control. The new company 
was placed under the leadership of Atherton Richards.43 The Hawaii 
Hochi observed that the reorganization was praised by propagandists 
as an example of the care taken by the “local ﬁ nancial moguls” to pro-
tect the interests of the small investors in the company. However, as 
the Hochi correctly observed, in fact “it [took] Mr. Small Stockholder 
for a ride—and [left] him to walk home!” Small investors who could 
not afford to participate in the reorganization were left with stock in a 
shell company worth a small fraction of their original investment.44 
It is clear that Dole had not expected Castle & Cooke to take this 
course of action.45 As he despondently wrote in 1934, 
Apparently the conclusion of this contract with the [Isthmian Line] 
caused considerable stir, resentment and bad feeling in Honolulu. This 
is something I have never been able to understand. I think that the 
record . . . shows that my action throughout was clear, clean and that 
if any of the Castle & Cooke directors [on the board of the Hawaiian 
Pineapple Co.] sensed danger to the . . . [c]ompany in allowing me to 
do what they authorized their warnings should have been expressed at 
the time of the directors’ meeting [of March 1931] either by their vote 
or by some word of caution.46 
Castle & Cooke had also been worried that the Hawaiian Pineapple 
Co. might be purchased by a continental United States corporation. 
General Foods had offered to purchase the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. 
both in 1929 and in 1932.47 The ofﬁ cial history of Castle & Cooke 
later observed that “The idea of outsiders purchasing Hawaiian Pine-
apple [had] sent shivers up the spines of local business leaders, who 
prided themselves on the home ownership of practically every island 
industry.” 48 
The editor of the Hawaii Hochi had predicted Dole’s downfall sev-
eral weeks before he was removed from control of his company. The 
editor, proved correct, observed
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. . . The interests of the territory . . . require that a ﬁ rm doing local 
business on such a large scale as the Hawaiian Pines should be pro-
tected from any internal weakness of organization that might endanger 
its stability and affect an industry that furnishes support to thousands 
of people . . .
. . . At one time it is understood that Dole obtained considerable 
ﬁ nancial backing from transportation interests which expected to 
retain the bulk of the pineapple shipping business. But Dole has always 
been impatient of restrictions and risked the charge of ingratitude in 
the matter of the Isthmian contract and in the purchase of cement 
from Japan.
The personal element does not enter into big business operations. If 
the policy of a ﬁ rm runs counter to interests of powerful transportation 
groups they will use every means to force a change in that policy. Such 
an inﬂ uence has undoubtedly been exerted in their reorganization of 
Hawaiian Pines, and Jimmy Dole seems to be the unfortunate victim. 
However much we may admire the initiative of the man whose persis-
tence in the face of sneers and discouragement laid the foundations 
of Hawaii’s second largest industry, we must recognize the industry he 
created is now of more importance than the man himself . . .49 
Contrary to some accounts, Castle & Cooke did not seek to exclude 
Dole from any further role in the company that he had founded. They 
valued his invaluable knowledge of the canned pineapple industry. 
However, Dole refused to accept that he had lost control of his com-
pany and tried to continue to manage the company. In July 1934 the 
situation became intolerable after Dole submitted a report to the 
company making several allegations, including that the new régime 
was trying to discredit him. However, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. 
believed that no such attitude toward Dole had existed.
. . . Certainly no group could spend so much money in the enthusiastic 
advancement of Mr. Dole’s name and at the same time do anything to 
disparage or belittle the person . . .
No organization the size of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. could func-
tion with more than one executive head. Since Dole found it impos-
sible to cooperate successfully with the man who succeeded him as 
head of the company, it was decided by the company that it was in 
everybody’s best interests that he sever his relationship with the com-
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pany as an executive ofﬁ cer. Dole was offered and accepted the posi-
tion of consultant with a retainer from the company of $30,000 per 
annum when the net proﬁ ts of the company for the previous year 
available to shareholders exceeded $2,500,000.50 
After his dismissal as general manager of the Hawaiian Pineapple 
Co. in October 1932, Dole tried to ﬁ nd a new career in the continental 
United States. In July 1933 the Roosevelt Administration appointed 
Dole to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) as Chief 
of the Food Division. Dole soon decided that he was not well-suited to 
the life of a government bureaucrat and not in sympathy with the New 
Deal. He tendered his letter of resignation in December of the same 
year.51 Hawai‘i’s business leaders must have been horriﬁ ed to learn 
a month earlier that Dole was being considered for the position of 
governor of Hawai‘i.52 After the AAA Dole became involved in a gold 
dredging venture in Ione, California. It produced mixed results. At 
the end of 1937 he returned to the food business with the formation 
James Drummond Dole as a senior citizen, undated. 
Dole Food Co. Inc. 
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of James Dole & Associates, this time with more success. This was a 
company organized to develop new products and processes.53 
Dole provides a good example of what David Skeel has recently 
described in Icarus in the Boardroom (2005) as an “Icaran failure.” 54 
Dole was a talented risk-taker who overstepped his bounds. The 
very qualities that made him special—self-conﬁ dence and visionary 
insight—spurred him to take misguided chances. Dole was well aware 
that Hawai‘i’s economy was controlled by a business oligarchy and that 
those businessmen who deﬁ ed it rarely fared well. His company kept 
scrapbooks with copies of all the newspaper articles about it—includ-
ing the prescient ones from the Hawaii Hochi cited in this article. He 
would have been aware of the fate of the last major businessman who 
had challenged the oligarchy, Claus Spreckels.55 Dole believed that 
he was a victim of the business oligarchy. In fact, as the article shows, 
he had recklessly sought to challenge the oligarchy’s domination of 
the Hawai‘i economy, despite being warned on several occasions not 
to do so. It is probable that he would have been able to reﬁ nance 
his debt if he had not challenged the oligarchy’s hegemony. Further-
more, Dole believed that after losing control of his company, he was 
unfairly forced to sever all connection with it. The company’s papers 
show that in fact the oligarchy tried to retain Dole’s services as a con-
sultant because of Dole’s talent for innovation and the importance 
of the “Dole” brand. However, Dole continued to act as if he was still 
in control of the company. The new management found his attitude 
intolerable and reluctantly had to part company with him. It could be 
argued that some business leaders who have been in charge of a com-
pany for a long period of time—Dole led his company for 30 years—
begin to believe that they are infallible. Both of Dole’s two immediate 
successors as head of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had to step down in 
similar circumstances to Dole. Dole clearly failed to recognize that the 
senior executives of Castle & Cooke had different commercial objec-
tives than his  but were willing to reach a compromise. It is somewhat 
ironic that the new Hawaiian Pineapple Company’s strong revival dur-
ing the remainder of the 1930s had much to do with the visionary 
Dole’s investment in the development of a new product, pineapple 
juice, and proposals for new kinds of advertising in the years immedi-
ate to his downfall.
* * *
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